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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA 
Alexandria Division 
   
NEMET CHEVROLET LTD. and 






 )  
 Plaintiffs, )  
 )  
 v. ) Civil Action No. 1:08-CV-254 (GBL/TCB) 
 )  
CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM, INC., ) 
) 
 
 )  
 Defendant. )  
 )  
 
PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION  
TO DISMISS OR STRIKE COMPLAINT  
 
Plaintiffs Nemet Chevrolet Ltd. and Thomas Nemet d/b/a Nemet Motors (“Nemet”) 
hereby oppose the motion to dismiss or strike of Defendant Consumeraffairs.com on the grounds 
that: Defendant’s motion is untimely and should not be considered absent proof of excusable 
neglect; Defendant is an information content provider not subject to protection under the 
Communications Decency Act (“CDA”); Defendant’s motion to strike punitive damages is 
groundless and contrary to well-recognized Virginia Commonwealth procedures; and, Plaintiffs’ 
commercial interests have been injured by Defendant’s violations of the Lanham Act and 
therefore have standing to sue. 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff, Nemet, a group of franchised automobile dealers with over ninety years of 
experience selling cars in the New York area, have an excellent reputation for fair dealing and 
truthfulness.  Compl. ¶ 10.  Defendant Consumeraffairs.com operates a commercial website, that 
misleadingly portrays itself as a “consumer affairs” website, but in reality solicits consumer 
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complaints, funnels them to class action lawyers, and generates revenue from advertising.  
Indeed, Defendant’s founder has admitted that advertising is the website’s sole source of income.  
Compl. ¶¶ 11-14.   
Defendant has admitted that every complaint submitted to the website is reviewed by 
class action attorneys, who have filed “hundreds of cases” based on that review.  Compl. ¶ 15.  
One of Defendant’s contributing editors is a practicing plaintiffs’ attorney in Fairfax, Virginia.  
Compl. ¶ 16.  Defendant’s website misleads consumers, diverting them from legitimate 
consumer protection organizations and agencies, and operates in commerce by deriving revenue 
from misrepresenting itself as a consumer website.  None of the alleged complaints against 
Plaintiffs that appears on Defendant’s website has been reported to the New York City 
Department of Consumer Affairs (“NYCDCA”), the state agency actually charged with 
protecting consumers where Plaintiffs’ business operates.  Compl. ¶¶11-13.   
Defendant, which does not contest personal jurisdiction, maintains an office in Virginia.  
Subject matter jurisdiction is based on federal question jurisdiction under the Lanham Act and 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338(a) and supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, and the facts 
establish diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 as well as based on complete diversity 
between Plaintiffs and Defendant and the amount in controversy.  Defendant has defamed Nemet 
and tortiously interfered with Nemet’s business by publishing numerous false complaints.  
Compl. ¶¶ 17-37, ¶¶ 38-45.  In this regard, Defendant is doing far more to solicit, shape, and 
steer the content of complaints than merely serving as an online forum.  As a website that 
promotes itself as a portal for potential consumer class action lawsuits, Defendant “empowers 
consumers by providing a forum for their complaints and a means for them to be contacted by 
lawyers if their complaints have legal merit.”  Declaration of Thomas Nemet (“Nemet Decl.”) ¶ 
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8, Attach. A.  Defendant states that they work with attorneys with consumer law expertise who 
may contact people who post complaints to discuss potential legal remedies.  Id. 
Defendant instructs people who use the website how to refine and shape the content of 
their complaints, in keeping with the website’s commercial goal of attracting advertising and 
funneling complaints to class action lawyers.  Defendant publishes original content, authored by 
its editorial staff, that explains how class action lawsuits work, and how potential claimants can 
find class action lawyers through consumeraffairs.com.  Nemet Decl. ¶ 9, Attach. B.  An article 
on the website authored by Defendant’s contributing editor, Virginia attorney Joan Lisante, 
explains that “to qualify as a class action, a lawsuit must affect a broad class of individuals, all 
similarly harmed . . .”.  Nemet Decl. ¶ 10, Attach. C. 
Meanwhile, Defendant’s website contains original content authored by Defendant that 
falsely casts Plaintiffs in a negative light to help attract more complaints.  Defendant published 
comments about Plaintiffs, clearly written by Defendant’s own editorial staff, that describe one 
of their own employee’s efforts to “summarize everything that can go wrong when buying a car.”  
Nemet Decl. ¶ 14, Attach. E.  Defendant’s own content then states “[i]f we had paid more 
attention to the complaints about Nemet Automotive Group of the airport-rich borough of 
Queens, she might not have had to bother.  The Nemet complaints pretty well cover the territory 
-- everything from prices engraved in sand to advertising that overlooks certain crucial 
elements.”  Id.  Defendant also states, in other original content published on the website, that 
despite Plaintiffs’ long history in the automobile business, “some of Nemet’s customers aren’t so 
impressed, as the complaints in this section indicate.  A selection of assorted recent complaints 
appears below, while categorized beefs are listed to the right.”  Nemet Decl. ¶ 13, Attach. D. 
Consistent with Defendant’s original content that attacks Nemet’s alleged pricing and 
advertising practices, Defendant’s website page for Nemet Motors categorizes complaints by 
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specific categories designed to shape complaints so they are more appealing for class action 
lawyers who work with the website to review complaints.  Nemet Decl. ¶¶ 12-13, Attach. D.  By 
establishing specific categories on its website such as “changing prices,” “extended warranties,” 
and “advertising,” reinforcing those categories with original editorial content authored by 
Defendant, and advising website users that class actions require similar harm among many 
parties, Defendant participates in creating the content of complaint by instructing users of the 
website how to channel their complaints into broad classes, consistent with the original content 
that Defendant authored and placed on its website to promote class action lawsuits.  Nemet Decl. 
¶ 13, Attach. D. 
Additionally, at least two recent complaints about Plaintiffs that are posted on 
Defendant’s website cannot be traced to any specific customer based on the name, address, and 
make and model year of car provided.  Nemet Decl. ¶ 16.  Plaintiffs believe these complaints 
may have been authored by the Defendant in yet another effort to solicit certain types of 
complaints and promote the website’s commercial purposes of attracting advertising (of which 
advertisements by law firms are a significant part) and facilitating class action lawsuits.  Id. 
Plaintiffs also allege that they have been damaged by Defendant’s false advertising under 
the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A), for using the name “consumer affairs” in commerce 
in a manner that is likely to cause confusion or deception about the origin, sponsorship, or 
approval of Defendant’s services or commercial activities.  Compl. ¶¶ 46-50.  Finally, Plaintiffs 
have been damaged by Defendant’s misuse of the name “consumer affairs” in a manner that is 
likely to influence consumer purchasing decisions by deceiving consumers, including Plaintiffs’ 
customers.  Compl. ¶¶ 51-56. 
This matter appears before the Court on a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure Rule 12(b)(6).  On a motion to dismiss, the allegations in Plaintiffs’ Complaint are 
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taken as true.  Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).  Otherwise, Jetform Corp. v. Unisys 
Corp., 11 F.Supp.2d 788, 789 (E.D. Va. 1998), succinctly states the applicable legal standards: 
Rule 12(b)(6) motions test the legal sufficiency of a complaint.  Randall v. United 
States, 30 F.3d 518, 522 (4th Cir. 1994).  Accordingly, such motions “should be 
granted only in very limited circumstances.”  Rogers v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. 
Co., 883 F.2d 324, 325 (4th Cir. 1989).  A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) 
should be denied “‘unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no 
set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’”  De Sole v. 
United States, 947 F.2d 1169, 1177 (4th Cir. 1991) (quoting Coakley & Williams, 
Inc. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 706 F.2d 456, 457 (4th Cir.1983)).  
Generally, a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) must be assessed in light of 
Rule 8’s liberal pleading standards.  Rule 8 requires “a short and plain statement 
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”  The complaint need 
only state sufficient facts to enable the defendant to draft a responsive pleading.  
5A Wright & Miller, Fed. Practice and Procedure, § 1357. 
In this case, Plaintiffs have submitted a declaration by Thomas Nemet that addresses 
certain facts about Defendant’s website.  The facts in this declaration need not be pleaded in a 
complaint but should nonetheless be taken as true on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT SHOULD DENY DEFENDANT’S 
 MOTION AS UNTIMELY     
 
 
Defendant filed their motion outside the time authorized by the Rules and has not filed 
the requisite motion averring excusable neglect.  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure clearly 
state that motions under Rule 12 must be filed “within 20 days after being served with the 
summons and complaint.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i).  Generally, the time limits in the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be enlarged if a request is made before the expiration of 
the prescribed period, or “on motion made after the time has expired if the party failed to act 
because of excusable neglect.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b)(1)(B).  Moreover, the Local Rules provide 
that after the complaint is filed, “all pleadings, motions, briefs, and filings of any kind must be 
timely filed with the Clerk’s Office of the division in which the case is pending.”  Local Civil 
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Rule 7(H).  Further, “[a]ny requests for an extension of time relating to motions must be in 
writing and, in general, will be looked upon with disfavor.”  Local Civil Rule 7(I). 
Here Defendant filed after the deadline expired and without any request for enlargement 
of time, much less a representation of excusable neglect.  Defendant was served with the 
Complaint by hand on March 19, 2008, at its office in Fairfax.  Declaration of Andrew Friedman 
(“Friedman Decl.”) ¶ 5, Attach H.  According to the Rules, Defendant’s answer or responsive 
motion should have been filed no later than April 8, 2008.  Defendant missed the deadline and 
filed the instant motion on April 14, 2008 – without seeking an enlargement.  Accordingly, the 
Court should decline to consider Defendant’s motion and order Defendant to answer the 
Complaint.  Denial would not unfairly prejudice the Defendant, which could raise the same 
issues in the future.       
II.   INFORMATION CONTENT LIKE CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM ARE NOT 
 PROTECTED BY THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT      
 
A. Defendant’s Motion Should Be Denied As Premature 
Defendant’s motion is premature because the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230, establishes an affirmative defense that must be addressed on the merits after discovery, 
not on a preliminary dispositive motion.  Though courts may refer to the CDA as creating a sort 
of immunity, the CDA does not block jurisdiction.  “Rather, the CDA has created a broad 
defense to liability.  Whether or not that defense applies in any particular case is a question that 
goes to the merits of that case….”  Energy Automation Sys., Inc. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 2007 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38452, *40-41 (M.D. Tenn. May 25, 2007).  In Energy Automation, the court 
held that the issue of whether the CDA applied to the defendant’s conduct concerning the 
plaintiff “requires a factual determination that is not appropriately made at this early stage of the 
litigation.  Ruling on that issue requires inquiry into a factual record that will not exist until the 
parties have been afforded ample time to complete discovery.”  Id.  Like the plaintiff in Energy 
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Automation, Nemet has submitted a declaration that disputes Defendant’s assertion of CDA 
immunity and Defendant’s contention that it is an “interactive computer service.”  See generally 
Nemet Decl. ¶¶ 8-16.  For this reason alone, Defendant’s motion to dismiss Counts I and II under 
the CDA should be denied as premature, and Defendant should be ordered to answer the 
Complaint. 
B.  Defendant Does Not Qualify for CDA “Immunity” 
Defendant’s motion to dismiss Counts I and II should be denied because it is an 
information content provider, therefore not qualified for the immunity under the CDA.  The 
CDA only protects providers or users of an “interactive computer service” from claims that 
would hold service providers liable for information originating with a third-party user of the 
service.  Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).  The statute defines an 
“interactive computer service” as  “any information service, system, or access software provider 
that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including 
specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or 
services offered by libraries or educational institutions.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2).  As set forth 
below, Defendant’s website is not an interactive computer service. 
Rather, Defendant’s website, consumeraffairs.com, is an information content provider 
that is not protected by the CDA.  The statute defines an “information content provider” as “any 
person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of 
information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.”  47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(f)(3) (emphasis added).  In considering whether a website is an information content 
provider, courts evaluate whether the website participated, in whole or in part, in the creation or 
the development of the information on the site.  Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. 
Roommates.com, LLC, 489 F.3d 921, 929 (9th Cir. 2007) (interactive roommate match service 
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responsible, “by categorizing, channeling and limiting the distribution of users’ profiles,” for 
creating or developing information on website); Hy Cite Corp. v. badbusinessbureau.com, 
L.L.C., 418 F.Supp.2d 1142, 1148-49 (D.Ariz. 2005) (denying CDA immunity for a purported 
consumer reporting website); MCW, Inc. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C., 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 6678, *25-26 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2004) (same); Energy Automation, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 38452 (same).  Defendant is engaged in precisely the type of content development and 
channeling that eliminates immunity under the CDA, and is engaged in conduct similar to the 
badbusinessbureau.com website that has repeatedly been denied the protections of the CDA. 
The series of opinions rejecting CDA immunity, including a number of lawsuits against 
the purported consumer website badbusinessbureau.com, are instructive because they identify 
specific types of conduct that render a website an information content provider.  Defendant 
curiously has failed to cite or distinguish any of these highly relevant opinions.  First, courts 
have noted that encouraging and instructing consumers on how to draft complaints and gather 
information goes beyond the traditional publisher role protected by the CDA, and constitutes 
creating and developing the content of the complaints.  MCW, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6678 at 
*34 (“the defendants cannot disclaim responsibility for disparaging material that they actively 
solicit”).  Applying similar logic, a court held that a website that solicited purchasers of 
telephone records and purchased those records for resale participated in the creation or 
development of the information, despite the fact that the phone records themselves were created 
by third-parties, and was therefore denied immunity under the CDA for alleged unfair trade 
practices.  FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74905, *15-16 (D.Wyo. Sept. 28, 
2007).   
Defendant undeniably instructs its website users how to craft complaints so they will be 
more appealing to consumer class action lawyers.  These instructions appear in original content 
Case 1:08-cv-00254-GBL-TCB   Document 8   Filed 04/28/08   Page 8 of 24 PageID# 51
   
9 
authored by Defendant.  An article authored by Virginia lawyer and consumeraffairs.com 
contributing editor Joan Lisante advises that “to qualify as a class action, a lawsuit must affect a 
broad class of individuals, all similarly harmed . . .”.  Nemet Decl. ¶ 10, Attach. C.  To advance 
Defendant’s goal of attracting complaints worthy of attention by consumer class action lawyers 
for a potential lawsuit against Plaintiffs, various portions of the website that refer to the Plaintiffs 
identify and reinforce specific categories of alleged misconduct by Plaintiffs – specifically, 
disputes over pricing, advertising, and extended warranties.  Nemet Decl. ¶ 13, Attach. D.  
Defendant admits that it forwards complaints to class action lawyers, for the purpose of having 
the complaints reviewed for possible lawsuits – a very similar type of conduct cited in 
Accusearch as the basis for finding the website was not protected by the CDA.  By providing 
guidance and channeling complaints against Plaintiffs into specific categories designed to attract 
class action lawyers’ attention, Defendant is helping shape and develop the content of the 
complaints. 
Second, courts have focused on the fact that the consumer-oriented website created and 
posted disparaging messages about a specific company.  MCW, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6678 at 
*32.  Defendant cannot dispute that it creates original and highly disparaging content about the 
Plaintiffs.  One comment authored by Defendant concerns an employee’s quest to “summarize 
everything that can go wrong when buying a car.”  Nemet Decl. ¶ 14, Attach. E.  The website 
proceeds to falsely disparage Plaintiffs: “[i]f we had paid more attention to the complaints about 
Nemet Automotive Group of the airport-rich borough of Queens, she might not have had to 
bother.  The Nemet complaints pretty well cover the territory -- everything from prices engraved 
in sand to advertising that overlooks certain crucial elements.”  Id.  In the section of the website 
specifically dedicated to Plaintiffs, a comment authored by Defendant belittles Plaintiffs’ long 
and successful history in the automobile business, stating “some of Nemet’s customers aren’t so 
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impressed, as the complaints in this section indicate.  A selection of assorted recent complaints 
appears below, while categorized beefs are listed to the right.”  Nemet Decl. ¶ 13, Attach. D.  
The latter insulting remarks serve as an introduction to the defamatory complaints against 
Plaintiffs, which appear immediately below the Defendant’s commentary – exactly the type of 
heading or introduction that was critically important to the ruling against badbusinessbureau.com 
in MCW. 
Third, soliciting individuals to “submit reports with the promise that individuals may 
ultimately be compensated for their reports” could support a finding that the website was 
responsible for creating or developing information provided by people who respond to the 
solicitation.  Hy Cite, 418 F.Supp.2d at 1149; see also 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3).  Defendant’s 
website trumpets the fact that every complaint submitted to the website is reviewed by class 
action attorneys, who have filed “hundreds of cases” as a result of that review.  Compl. ¶ 15.  
This key factor distinguishes third-party submissions to comparatively passive websites like 
AOL, MySpace, Ebay, and Yahoo, which generally implicate routine publisher functions like the 
decision of whether to publish, edit, or withhold third-party content.  Here, Defendant is 
participating in creating content by soliciting specific kinds of complaints with the promise of 
potential compensation, in the form of a class action lawsuit recovery.      
Fourth, websites that engage in “categorizing, channeling and limiting” information that 
appears on the website are responsible, at least in part, for creating or developing the 
information.  Fair Hous. Council, 489 F.3d at 929.  Defendant accomplishes this by listing 
“categorized beefs” about Nemet on the website, such as pricing and advertising complaints, and 
by reinforcing those categories in highly negative editorial comments about Plaintiffs.  Nemet 
Decl. ¶ 13, Attach. D.  Viewing these actions in the context of a website that admits it packages 
complaints for review by class action lawyers, the fact that Defendant ConsumerAffairs.com has 
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created and reinforced specific categories of complaints about Nemet Plaintiffs plays a crucially 
important role in shaping the content of the complaints.  Indeed, Defendant Consumeraffairs.com 
derives the most benefit from the class action lawyers who review the complaints, and advertise 
on Defendant’s website, if the complaints fit into categories that satisfy the commonality 
requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. 
In conclusion, courts have consistently rejected CDA immunity for websites that 
participate in creating content by shaping or developing third-party information posted on the 
site.  The allegations in the Complaint and in the Declaration of Thomas Nemet, both of which 
extensively describe content posted on Defendant’s own website, make a compelling case for 
finding that Defendant Consumeraffairs.com is an information content provider that does not 
qualify for the immunity provisions of the CDA.    
C. Defendant Cites Cases Which Are Inappropriate.      
The cases cited by the Defendant are all distinguishable.  Defendant’s original content 
and solicitation of complaints for the purpose of fueling class action lawsuits simply goes well 
beyond the traditional editorial functions performed by websites like AOL, MySpace, and Ebay.  
See, e.g., Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332-33 (traditional publisher role involves decision whether to 
publish, edit, or withdraw  a posting); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F.Supp.2d 843, 847 (W.D. Tex. 
2007) (traditional editorial function means deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone, or 
alter content) (citations omitted).  The case of Whitney Information Network Inc. v. Xcentric 
Ventures, LLC, was decided on summary judgment, after the facts surrounding the plaintiff’s 
particular allegations in that case were fully vetted in discovery.  2008 WL 450095, *7 (M.D. 
Fla. Feb. 15, 2008).  But see Accusearch, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74905 (rejecting CDA 
immunity on a motion for summary judgment).  More importantly, plaintiff Whitney did not 
dispute that badbusinessbureau.com was an “interactive computer service,” while the Nemet 
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Plaintiffs hotly dispute this contention and believe the Defendant is a non-immune information 
content provider.  Id. at *8. 
The only court that has applied CDA immunity to a ‘consumer complaint’ website was 
faced with completely different claims and arguments than Plaintiffs’ contentions this case, or 
the claims and contentions addressed in other opinions that have denied CDA immunity.  In 
Global Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, plaintiff Global argued only that the defendant 
refused to remove specific content and alleged only “minor participation” by the defendant in 
composing the alleged defamatory messages.  2008 WL 565102, *3 (D.Ariz. Feb. 28, 2008).  As 
discussed, Defendant: authors and publishes original articles that guide website users on how to 
effectively draft complaints that will interest class action lawyers; authors and publishes original 
content in the form of highly negative opinions about the Plaintiffs, then solicits complaints; 
repeatedly suggests specific categories of alleged misconduct for website users to focus on; then 
promises that all complaints will be reviewed by class action lawyers, and that users of the 
website may recover money as a result.  Furthermore, Plaintiff Nemet’s Declaration states that 
customers cannot be identified for at least two of the complaints against Plaintiffs, and that these 
complaints were likely authored by Defendant’s editors to help solicit more complaints.  Nemet 
Decl. ¶ 16.  This latter point clearly cannot be resolved without fact discovery. 
III. DEFENDANT’S ARGUMENT AS TO PUNITIVE  
 DAMAGES IS MISPLACED       
The Court should deny Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiffs’ punitive damages claim 
because Virginia law caps punitive damage awards, not the ability to claim punitive damages in 
excess of the cap. Of course, it is axiomatic under Virginia’s law that neither a court nor a jury 
may award punitive damages in excess of $350,000.  Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-38.1.  However, the 
statute clearly acknowledges a party’s ability to claim punitive damages in excess of the cap, as 
well as a jury’s power to determine that punitive damages exceeded the cap: “The jury shall not 
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be advised of the limitation prescribed by this section.  However, if a jury returns a verdict for 
punitive damages in excess of the maximum amount specified in this section, the judge shall 
reduce the award and enter judgment for such damages in the maximum amount provided by this 
section.”  Id.  The Supreme Court of Virginia expressly endorsed this approach in an opinion 
concerning Virginia’s medical malpractice damages cap: “A trial court applies the remedy’s 
limitation only after the jury has fulfilled its fact-finding function.  Thus, Code § 8.01-581.15 
does not infringe upon the right to a jury trial because the section does not apply until after a jury 
has completed its assigned function in the judicial process.”  Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosps., 237 
Va. 87, 96 (1989) (emphasis in original).  Clearly, the statutory cap limits the amount of punitive 
damages that can be awarded but does not affect the amount of punitive damages that can be 
claimed in a complaint.    
To the extent the two unpublished cases relied upon by the Defendant create any 
confusion about how the damages caps actually operate in the courts of the Commonwealth of 
Virginia, the text of the statute and Etheridge control on this issue of state law.  See Faircloth v. 
Finesod, 938 F.2d 513, 517 n.9 (4th Cir. 1991) (federal courts generally bound by state court’s 
interpretation of its own statutes); Rutherford v. Blankenship, 468 F.Supp. 1357, 1361-62 (W.D. 
Va. 1979) (“The Virginia Supreme Court’s interpretation as to the import of its own law is 
conclusive.”); Ferguson v. Manning, 216 F.2d 188, 188 (4th Cir. 1954) (“It is too well settled to 
admit of argument that the federal courts are bound by the interpretation placed upon the statutes 
of a state by its highest court.”).  Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to strike the punitive damages 
claims should be denied. 
IV PLAINTIFFS ARE INJURED PARTIES WHO HAVE STANDING 
 TO SUE UNDER THE LANHAM ACT              
 
D. Constitutional Standing Is Undisputed 
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Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiffs are injured parties entitled to standing under the 
Constitution.  Whether a party has standing “involves both constitutional limitations on federal-
court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise.”  Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 
(1975).  To establish constitutional standing, “a plaintiff must show (1) an actual or threatened 
injury (2) that was caused by the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant and (3) that is likely 
to be redressed by a favorable decision.”  Planned Parenthood of S.C., Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 
786, 789 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)).  
Defendant concedes that Plaintiffs have adequately alleged injury that was caused by 
Defendant’s allegedly illegal conduct, or that a favorable decision would at partially remedy the 
Plaintiffs’ injury.  See Compl. ¶¶ 36-37.   
E. As a Party Injured in Commerce by Defendant’s Misleading Use of the Name 
“Consumer Affairs,” Plaintiffs Have Prudential Standing to Sue Under the 
Lanham Act 
Plaintiffs have standing to sue under the plain language of the Lanham Act, the Fourth 
Circuit’s approach to evaluating Lanham Act standing, and the approach used in most other 
circuits.  Defendant’s assertion that Plaintiffs must be a direct competitor to assert Lanham Act 
claims is contrary to Fourth Circuit precedent and the facts of this case. 
1. The Language and Purpose of the Lanham Act Support Plaintiffs’ 
Standing to Sue in This Case 
The Lanham Act does not restrict standing to competitors.  Rather, it is meant “to protect 
persons engaged in such commerce [as Congress may regulate] against unfair competition.”  15 
U.S.C. § 1127.  To this end, Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides: 
 (1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or 
any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or 
device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or 
misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, 
which— 
 
Case 1:08-cv-00254-GBL-TCB   Document 8   Filed 04/28/08   Page 14 of 24 PageID# 57
   
15 
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the 
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, 
or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, 
or commercial activities by another person, or 
 
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, 
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another 
person’s goods, services, or commercial activities, 
 
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is 
likely to be damaged by such act. 
 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (emphasis added).  It is well-settled that “[t]he starting point for any issue 
of statutory interpretation…is the language of the statute itself.”  United States v. Bly, 510 F.3d 
453, 460 (4th Cir. 2007).  The plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in the 
“rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at 
odds with the intentions of its drafters.”  United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242 
(1989) (citations and quotations omitted).  This plain language does not prevent the Plaintiffs, 
who are in the business of selling automobiles, from suing a website that posts false consumer 
complaints and deceives consumers into thinking the complaints are the accurate, fact-checked 
complaints posted by legitimate consumer protection agencies and organizations.  Congress 
easily could have limited standing to “competitors” rather than “any person,” but instead chose 
to allow broad standing to assert Lanham Act claims. 
Plaintiffs’ claims are also consistent with the overall remedial purpose of the Lanham 
Act.  The Act is designed to provide a remedy for “all persons” who are victimized by 
misleading and deceptive use of trade names, whether for unfair competition, false advertising, 
or trademark or trade dress infringement.  See, e.g., Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 658 
F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 1981) (“§ 43(a) of the Lanham Act is remedial in nature, and should be 
interpreted and applied broadly so as to effectuate its remedial purpose.”); Thorn v. Reliance Van 
Co., 736 F.2d 929, 932 n.5, 933 (3d Cir. 1984) (acknowledging the “widely-held view that as a 
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remedial statute, [Section 43(a)] should be broadly construed,” and holding, “the mere fact that 
Thorn is not a competitor of Reliance does not, in and of itself, preclude him from bringing suit 
under section 43(a).”); Seven-Up Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 86 F.3d 1379, 1383 (5th Cir. 1996) 
(“Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act has been characterized as a remedial statute that should be 
broadly construed.”); Frisch’s Rests. v. Elby’s Big Boy, 670 F.2d 642, 651 (6th Cir. 1982) 
(quoting Warner Bros., 658 F.2d at 79); F.E.L. Publ’ns, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 214 
U.S.P.Q. 409, 416 (7th Cir. 1982) (“Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act is a remedial statute that 
must be broadly construed.”); Montgomery v. Noga, 168 F.3d 1282, 1300 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(acknowledging the “the well-established principle that section 43(a) should be broadly 
construed”).  Based on the broad language of the statute and its broad remedial purpose, it would 
be unjust to reject Plaintiffs’ claims. 
2. Under the Fourth Circuit Approach to Determining Standing Under the 
Lanham Act, Defendant’s Motion Must be Denied 
Defendant’s discussion of the various tests applied in different circuits and attempts to 
characterize Plaintiffs’ claims as “typical” Lanham Act allegations, obscure the fact that the 
Fourth Circuit takes a much more realistic and fact-based approach to determining standing 
under the Lanham Act.  In the Fourth Circuit, the touchstone of the analysis of Lanham Act 
standing is whether the claimant is trying to protect purely commercial interests against 
unscrupulous commercial conduct.  Made in the USA Found. v. Phillips Foods, Inc., 365 F.3d 
278, 280 (4th Cir. 2004).  In Made in the USA, a controlling case that Defendant elected to bury 
in a footnote, the Fourth Circuit denied standing to a group that represented the interests of 
consumers.  Id.  However, the Court also relied on a First Circuit case holding that a Plaintiff 
must have a reasonable interest in being protected from false advertising to have standing and 
must therefore “show a link or ‘nexus’ between itself and the alleged falsehood.”  Camel Hair & 
Cashmere Inst, Inc. v. Assoc. Dry Goods Corp., 799 F.2d 6, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1986).   
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In Camel Hair, the First Circuit held that the plaintiff-trade group had standing, even 
though neither it nor any of its members were competitors of the defendant, because the plaintiff 
had “a strong interest in preserving cashmere’s reputation as a high quality fibre.”  799 F.2d at 
12.  Consequently, the Fourth Circuit concluded that standing was proper in Camel Hair because 
the plaintiff was “suing to protect a commercial interest.”  Made in the USA, 365 F.3d at 280.  
The Fourth Circuit denied standing in Made in the USA because the plaintiffs were merely 
consumers, and no circuit recognizes consumer standing under the Lanham Act.  See id. (“At 
least half of the circuits hold (and none of the others disagree) that the second of these Lanham 
Act provisions, § 45, or 15 U.S.C. § 1127, bars a consumer from suing under the Act.”). 
Here, Plaintiffs sell cars, a business where a good reputation and customer trust are 
absolutely essential to success.  Over 90 years, Plaintiffs built a stellar reputation with customers 
and with the true consumer advocates, the New York City Department of Consumer Affairs.  
Compl. ¶ 10; Nemet Decl. ¶ 4.1  It is crucially important to understand that the NYCDCA 
website includes hundreds of complaints about car dealers throughout the New York City area, 
but not a single complaint about Plaintiffs.  Compl. ¶ 13; Nemet Decl. ¶ 4.  Thus, Plaintiffs are 
directly harmed when Defendant misleadingly describes itself as a “consumer affairs” website 
but irresponsibly solicits, develops, and posts defamatory content, all for the purely commercial 
purposes of (a) funneling those defamatory complaints to class action lawyers and (b) attracting 
advertising revenue.  Plaintiffs’ Lanham Act claims are clearly intended to protect Plaintiffs’ 
purely commercial interest in legitimate, honest, and accurate consumer affairs organizations, 
and to remedy Plaintiffs’ injuries as a result of Defendant’s misleading commercial use of the 
                                                 
1  The NYCDCA also posts complaints against automobile dealers on its website.  None 
of those complaints are about Nemet Motors because Nemet Motors provides excellent customer 
service and works to resolve the few customer complaints it receives, but some New York 
automobile dealers have dozens or even hundreds of complaints posted on the official New York 
consumer affairs website for improper business practices. 
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“consumer affairs” name.  Defendant’s refusal to address or distinguish Camel Hair – endorsed 
by the Fourth Circuit in Made in the USA – is tantamount to an admission that Plaintiffs have 
standing in this case.  
Defendant’s approach to standing in this case is unduly narrow and would lead to absurd 
and unintended limitations on the facially broad scope of the Lanham Act.  Defendant self-
servingly argues that “the parties most likely to be directly affected [by Defendant’s confusing 
and misleading use of the “consumer affairs” name] are those governmental agencies responsible 
for addressing such complaints.”  Def.’s. Br. Supp. Mot. Strike Dismiss 13.  Public consumer 
affairs agencies have neither the time nor the resources to pursue false advertising claims.  
Furthermore, the Lanham Act is intended to provide a remedy for companies that are harmed in 
commerce, not for public agencies.   
3. The Multi-Factor Test Applied in Many Circuits Supports Plaintiffs’ 
Standing to Sue in This Case.   
Even if this Court applies the multi-factor test and engages in the factual inquiry 
conducted in some circuits, Plaintiffs have standing under the Lanham Act.  Contrary to 
Defendant’s misleading arguments, only a minority of the circuits – the Seventh, Ninth and 
Tenth -- holds that a plaintiff must be a direct competitor to sue under the Lanham Act.  See 
Def.’s Br. 11.  See Phoenix of Broward, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 489 F.3d 1156, 1164-65 (11th 
Cir. 2007).2  The Eighth Circuit has not adopted this approach.  See Am. Ass’n of Orthodontists v. 
Yellow Book USA, Inc., 434 F.3d 1100, 1104 (8th Cir. 2006) (“But we need not resolve what 
may be a circuit conflict over the appropriate test for standing . . .”).  The First and Second 
Circuits apply “a less categorical approach to determine standing, wherein the dispositive issue is 
                                                 
2 “With the exception of the Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Circuits, the courts have held that 
the plaintiff and defendants need not always be in direct competition with each other for plaintiff 
to have standing to sue for injunctive relief under § 43(a).”  4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 27:32 (4th ed. 1996, supp. 2007). 
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not the degree of ‘competition,’ but whether the plaintiff has a ‘reasonable interest’ to be 
protected against the type of harm that the Lanham Act is intended to prevent.”  Phoenix of 
Broward, 489 F.3d at 1165 (citing Camel Hair and Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Cosprophar, Inc., 32 
F.3d 690, 694 (2d Cir. 1994)).  As noted, the Fourth Circuit has previously cited with approval 
the First Circuit’s approach to Lanham Act standing, which analysis should control here. 
 Plaintiffs would also have standing were the Court inclined to apply the test used by the 
other circuits.  Three circuits – the Third, Fifth, and most recently the Eleventh – have adopted a 
multi-factor test developed by the Supreme Court for antitrust cases.  See Conte Bros. Auto., Inc. 
v. Quaker State-Slick 50, Inc., 165 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 1998); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway 
Corp., 242 F.3d 539 (5th Cir. 2001); Phoenix of Broward, 489 F.3d at 1163-64 (“…we join the 
Third and Fifth Circuits and adopt the test for prudential standing articulated in Conte Bros.”).  
This approach is further endorsed by “two prominent commentaries.”  Procter & Gamble, 242 
F.3d at 562 n.51 (citing MCCARTHY § 27:32 n.1; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 3 cmt. f (1995)).  Plaintiffs emphasize that the Fourth Circuit has not adopted 
this approach and has instead relied on the more flexible analysis conducted in the First and 
Second Circuits.   
 Under the multi-factor approach used by the Third, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits: 
[T]o determine whether a party has prudential standing to bring a false advertising 
claim under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, a court should consider and weigh 
the following factors: 
 
(1) The nature of the plaintiff’s alleged injury: Is the injury of a type that 
Congress sought to redress in providing a private remedy for violations of 
the [Lanham Act]? 
 
 (2) The directness or indirectness of the asserted injury. 
 
(3) The proximity or remoteness of the party to the alleged injurious 
conduct. 
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(4) The speculativeness of the damages claim. 
 
(5) The risk of duplicative damages or complexity in apportioning 
damages. 
 
Phoenix of Broward, 489 F.3d at 1163-64 (quoting Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 233).  All of these 
factors weigh in favor of standing for Plaintiffs’ Lanham Act claims against Defendant in this 
case, under both Sections 43(a)(1)(A) and 43(a)(1)(B).3 
 As to the first factor, Plaintiffs have suffered a competitive injury as a result of 
Defendant’s misleading use of the “consumer affairs” name to lend legitimacy to unconfirmed, 
defamatory complaints about the Plaintiffs.  As a result of Defendant’s misleading use, 
Defendant profits by generating class action lawsuits and attracting advertising revenue while 
Plaintiffs have suffered lost business and damage to reputation, among other harms.  Plaintiffs 
are clearly persons engaged in commerce, and the Lanham Act is intended to protect persons in 
commerce from the type of false advertising and unfair competition that Defendant is accused of 
doing in the Complaint.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1127.  This is the type of injury that the Lanham Act is 
intended to remedy.  For all of these reasons, this factor weighs in favor of standing for 
Plaintiffs. 
 As to the second factor, Plaintiffs have described how Defendant’s misuse of the 
“consumer affairs” name has directly injured Plaintiffs’ commercial interests.  Consumers are 
actually misled into thinking that Defendant will help remedy their complaints and do not avail 
themselves of legitimate consumer affairs agencies; Plaintiffs have no complaints on the 
                                                 
3 In Conte Brothers, the Third Circuit flatly rejected the argument that standing under 
Section 43(a) should depending on the type of claim alleged: false advertising or false 
designation of origin.  “Section 43(a) provides no support for drawing a distinction in standing 
depending on the type of § 43(a) violation alleged.  The operative language that provides for 
standing – ‘any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged’ – does not 
purport to distinguish between the two types of actions available under § 43(a).”  165 F.3d at 
232. 
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legitimate consumer affairs agency website of the NYCDCA.  Compl. ¶ 13; Nemet Decl. ¶ 4.  As 
a direct consequence of Defendant’s misleading use of the “consumer affairs” name, consumers 
who are misled or confused may refuse to do business with Plaintiffs, and Plaintiffs have and 
will continue to lose business and suffer damage to their reputation among customers.  See 
Compl. ¶ 36.  The second factor also weighs in favor of standing for Plaintiffs. 
 As to the third factor, the Court should ask whether there is an “identifiable class” of 
persons “whose self-interest would normally motivate them to vindicate the public interest by 
bringing suit.”  Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 234.  As discussed above, Defendant would have this 
Court hold that the only parties who have standing to sue this Defendant under the Lanham Act 
are the legitimate consumer affairs agencies or organizations.  Under this perverse argument, the 
“identifiable class” has no conceivable commercial reason to challenge Defendant’s misleading 
use of the “consumer affairs” name.  The persons with the strongest self-interest in stopping 
Defendant’s misleading use are the consumers who are being misled (but who do not have 
standing under the Lanham Act) and the commercial businesses that are being harmed by 
Defendant’s misconduct.  As a commercial entity with a stellar reputation that works hard to 
resolve the few consumer complaints it receives, and as an entity that has no complaints posted 
on the honest and legitimate consumer affairs website in New York City, Plaintiffs have the 
strongest self-interest in ensuring that Defendant’s misleading, for-profit misuse of the 
“consumer affairs” name is stopped as soon as possible.  The third factor also weighs in favor of 
standing for Plaintiffs. 
 As to the fourth factor, Plaintiffs damages are concrete, not speculative.  Plaintiffs allege 
to have lost business as a result of Defendant’s misleading use of the “consumer affairs” name, 
which is exacerbated by the false and defamatory content that Defendant places on its website.  
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At this stage in the litigation, these allegations should be accepted as true.  The fourth factor 
weighs in favor of standing for Plaintiffs. 
 Finally, as to the fifth factor, there is no danger of duplicative damages, or complexity in 
apportioning damages, as to either claim.  It would not be difficult for this Court to apportion 
damages among the four counts in this case, and the injunctive relief Plaintiffs seek against 
Defendant’s misuse of the “consumer affairs” name would not be duplicative in any event.  This 
factor also weighs in favor of standing for Plaintiffs. 
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 Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the Court should deny the 
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